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fashions a means of escape. Unless
we insist upon observance of the law
and prompt and speedy punishment of
offenders, we imperil the safety of our
lives and homes. Unenforceable laws
must go. Begin at the top. Impose
life sentence as a maximum and the
idea of judicial murder is dispelled.
Should the innocent or the insane then
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be convicted and sentenced, opportunity for vindication and correction is
afforded. Seven States of the Union
have already done so and we have yet
to hear that human life is less precious
in Wisconsin than Missouri. On the
contrary, the whole nation may profit
by the example.

Colorado Supreme Court Decisions
(Editors Note-It is intended in each
issue of the Record to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the Supreme
Court.
These abstracts will be printed
only after the time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or

No. 11,931
Conrad v. Davison
Decided June 4, 1928.

In the event that a petition for rehearing
has been filed the abstract will be printed

Release of Trust Deed-Innocent Purchaser.

of).

Facts-Conrad held a note and a
trust deed taken as collateral to secure
an antecedent debt. He received same
in reliance on the record showing a release of a prior trust deed at the written request of the payee, stating payment in full. Said release was executed before maturity of the obligation but not acknowledged or recorded
until a year thereafter.
Davison
claimed the said release was invalid,
setting up that the note was not in
fact paid at that time and that later
he had bought the note in a transaction of purchase and not of payment,
that Conrad was put on inquiry by the
release before maturity and the lapse
of time between its execution and recording, and that an antecedent debt
was not value.

only after the petition has'been disposed

No. 12,009
Holbrook v. Bank
Decided June 11, 1928.
Banks-Preferred Claims-Insolvency
Facts-The irrigation District sought
to obtain a decree that a deposit standing to the credit of the Irrigation District in the Defendant Bank should be
paid by the State Bank Commissioner
as a preferred claim upon two counts:
1. That the Secretary of the Irrigation Company had unlawfully deposited the monies in the bank instead of
remitting them to the County Treasurer. The Secretary of the irrigation
company also being cashier of the
bank, and that, therefore, the bank
must be deemed to have accepted the
deposits with knowledge that they
were unlawfully deposited, and that
such deposits must be treated as a
trust fund.
Held-1. That to entitle a trust
creditor to a preference, it must be
satisfactorily established that the property of the insolvent remaining for
distribution includes the proceeds of
the trust estate.

Held-The note not being paid in
fact, the release in question would be
invalid except as against a subsequent
bona fide encumbrancer for value. Conrad was such, as the rule that a release before maturity puts one on inquiry is not in point where the request for release is signed by the payee
herself and states payment in full. The
lapse of time between execution and
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the acknowledgment and recording of
said release is not material, nor is the
contention that an antecedent debt is
not value of any merit.

No. 11,967
Dawson v. Scruggs
Decided June 11, 1928.
Mechanic's Lien-Fixtures
Facts-Dawson sued the ScruggsVandervort Barney Realty Company et
al., including Edward 0. Lowy to seeure a personal judgment against Lowy
and to have a mechanic's lien upon certain real property decreed and foreclosed. The Court below gave him a
personal judgment against Lowy, but
held against him on the lien claim.
The lien was claimed for installing
new pipes in a refrigerator plant that
had been in use as a part of the building for fifteen years.
Held-Not necessary that in order to
constitute a fixture that the pipes
should be permanently affixed to the
freehold, if it constitutes a part of a
plant of machinery necessary to the
successful operation of the whole, then
it may properly be termed a fixture.
The Plaintiff has a valid lien and is
entitled to have it foreclosed.

No. 12,038
Armstrong v. Denver Saunders System
Decided June 4, 1928.
Statutes-Tax on Automobiles Transporting Passengers for Hire.
Facts-Defendants in error brought
mandamus to compel the Secretary of
State to issue licenses to them without
the additonal fee required under S. L.
1927, Chap. 135, which imposed upon
"motor vehicles used in the transportation of passengers for hire * * * an
annual registration license fee of five
dollars for each passenger seat In said
vehicle at rated carrying capacity".
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Defendants in error rent automobiles
to persons who themselves drive them,
the rental contract providing that customers shall not use the car as "a private or public carrier of passengers
for hire". Demurrer to the complaint
was overruled. The Secretary of State
stood thereon, and the writ being made
permanent, appeals.
Held-These cars are not within the
scope of the statute, for defendants in
error customers are bailees and not
passengers in the sense of the statute.
The statute cannot be stretched to
cover the case of lease of the car itself,
especially where the rental contract
forbids the customer to use it as a
carrier for hire.

No. 12,068
Armstrong v. Johnson Storage
Decided June 4, 1928.
Motor Vehicles-Licenses-Mandamus
Facts-Johnson brought mandamus
against Armstrong, Secretary of State
to compel the issuance of a license for
a motor truck upon payment of fees
exclusive of those required by Session
Laws of 1927 chapter 135. Defendant
demurred to the alternative writ, demurrer was overruled, and defendant
elected to stand and the writ was made
permanent.
Held-The fact that Johnson was engaged in the business of transporting
goods for hire over the streets of the
City and County of Denver, and does
not use the highways outside of the
City of Denver, does not exclude him
from the act. The streets of a city are
highways of the State. The State has
a right to license motor vehicles for
hire within the limits of the City of
Denver, at least until the City of Denver, under the Twentieth Amendment
makes attempt to so license them itself and whether or not Denver has
that right, it Is not necessary to decide
at this time.
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No. 11,744
Colorado v. Riverview Drainage District.
Decided April 2, 1928.
Quasi-Public Corporation-Liabilityfor
Tort.
Facts-The Colorado Investment and
Realty Company, hereinafter called
Plaintiff, owned land in drainage disttrict.
Drainage ditch, as proposed,
traversed plaintiff's land and if constructed as planned, would benefit the
land. Land was assessed for benefits
before ditch was constructed. Later
proposed line of ditch was abandoned
and ditch was actually constructed, so
that it was of no benefit to the land in
question. Land was sold for non-payment of drainage assessments, and
plaintiff redeemed under protest, and
brought suit for damages and to have
assessment, etc., be decreed illegal, and
for refund of the money paid and for
restraining order.
General Demurrer was filed below
and sustained on the one point that
the drainage district cannot be sued
because there was no statute authorizing suit against it.
Held - 1. Drainage District n o t
created by the State to remove the
menace to public health, but constructed for the primary benefit to the owners of the land thereunder by making
their lands productive, is not such a
public corporation that the district
may not be sued in a proper action.

sale with consent of seller. When abstract of title was furnished, it showed
that a prior grantor had made a reservation of certain oil and gas rights and
purchaser refused to accept title.
Held-1. Abstract did not show merchantable title.
2. If Vendee has in good faith, after
entering upon the land, made improvements upon the same, or planted crops,
he may retain possession until he removes the same.
No. 11,822
Fleming v. Miller
Decided May 14, 1928.
Evidence at Former Trial-Insane Person.
Facts-M. sued F. for fraud and testified. Thereafter M. started another
suit involving the same transaction,
but became insane before trial. His
testimony at the first trial was read
at the second. F. was permitted to
testify, but only as to the matters covered in the transcript of M's testimony
at the first trial. F. claimed the right
to testify about the whole series of
transactions; M. objected to his testifying at all under C. L. '21, par. 6556.
Held-The error, if any, was in favor of F. and he cannot complain.
No. 11,839
Morley v. Post
Decided May 21, 1928.
Libel

Vendor-Purchaser-MerchantableTitle

Facts-Plaintiff below sued Defendant on three causes of action for libel.
Demurrers to the Complaint were sustained by the Court below and Plaintiff
elected to stand upon his Complaint.

Facts-Plaintiff agreed to convey to
Defendant by good and sufficient warranty deed certain land and to furnish
an abstract of title, showing merchantable title. Purchaser went into possession under this executory contract of

Held-1. To constitute libel, it is
not necessary that a publication shall
impute to a person the commission of
a crime, it is sufficient if it tends to
impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue
or reputation.

No. 11,771
Rule v. Ling
Decided May 28, 1928.
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2. Where a qualified privilege is
claimed, the condition that makes such
a communication privileged is that it
be not made maliciously.
3. Where words or cartoons are ambiguous in their import, or may permit
more than one interpretation -and in
some sense be defamatory, the question
whether they are such, is for the jury.
No. 11,862
Insurance v. Baker
Decided May 21, 1928.
Insurance-Waivcr of Appraisement
Facts-Baker suffered a fire loss
while insured in the companies noted.
The adjuster's position was that
Baker's loss was "slight, nominal ***",
and he offered only $200.00, whereas
Baker insisted the loss was total and
$1000.00, the full face of the policy, was
due. Baker sued and recovered in full,
and the companies seek reversal on
the ground of his non-compliance with
the policy provision for appraisement
"in the event of disagreement as to
the amount of loss".
Held-Appraisement clause presupposes a bona fide disagreement. Here
the company's attitude in substance
was a deliberate attempt to create a
disagreement and, hence, outside the
scope of the policy's provision. Testimony further shows a repudiation of
liability, which waived the right of
appraisement.
No. 11,910
Hughes v. Pallas
Decided May 14, 1928.
Landlord and Tenant-Restrictions in
Lease.
Facts-Jones leased premises from
plaintiffs in error for a restaurant and
cigar store. The lease provided the
premises shall be used "for the purpose of conducting the business of a
restaurant and cigar store; and for no
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Jones allowed two
other business".
churches and the Salvation Army to
use the room for rummage sales on
three separate days, and the lessors
claiming such was a violation of tho
lease, seek to forfeit the same. Judgment went against the lessors, whr
appealed.
Held-"No other business" as used
in the lease meant occupation and use
of the premises permanent and continuous in its character, as distinguished from a single act or business
transaction or an occasional day's use
of the premises without rent or profit
to anyone. Such a charitable use as
here shown is outside the scope of the
prohibition.
No. 11,917
Jones v. Panak
Decided May 21, 1928.
Assignment of Claim-Counter-Claim
Facts-One Pry built a house for
Panak; on the agreed price there was
due $2,772. Ply assigned this claim to
Jones, who brought suit for this
amount. Part of this was paid. Panak
counter-claimed for more than the balance due from her, because of defective work by Pry, and judgment for
this difference was awarded against
Jones.
Held-On an assigned claim, the defendant may counter-claim against the
assignee for an amount equal to the
claim, but not for more than this.
Reversed
No. 11,918
Cortez v. Stabler
Decided May 21, 1928.
Fraudulant Conveyance-Pu r c h a s e
Money Trust.
Facts-C. Company brought this action to set aside a transfer of a farm
from defendant Minnie Stabler to her
husband. The trial court found that
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the husband had paid the entire purchase price and all expenses of maintenance, and that C. Company had in
no way been misled by the wife's apparent title.
Held-Payment of the price gave the
husband the beneficial ownership under a resulting trust. Here, there was
no gift or advancement to the wife and
the elements of estoppel are lacking.
The conveyance, therefore, cannot be
set aside.
Affirmed
No. 12,076
IndustrialCommission v. Nissen
Decided May 14, 1928.
Industrial Commission - R e v i e w Course of Employment.
Facts-N. worked on his employer's
farm and lived in his employer's alfalfa mill, a half-mile away. Going
from the farm to the mill, he was
killed. The District Court reversed
the Commission's award denying compensation.
Held-This accident did not arise
out of or in the course of N's employment, because there was no casual connection between the employment and
the accident.
No. 12,081
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relying on the presumption of death
arising from seven years unexplained
absence. The company contests on the
sole ground that the policy had lapsed
for non-payment five years after the
disappearance of the insured, and that
no presumption as to death within the
seven years arises where no showing
is made of the absentee's contact with
a specific peril. The jury found insured had died within the seven years
and within the life of the policy, and
found for plaintiff.
Held-The presumption arising after
seven years' unexplained absence is
that of death only, and not as to time
of death, but evidence of character,
health, domestic relations, and the like,
making abandonment of home improbable, is pertinent on the latter issue,
and here justified the jury in its findings.
International Law
"There can be no crime which leaves
a man without legal rights. One is always entitled to insist that he shall not
be punished, except in accordance with
law, or without such a hearing as the
universally accepted principles of justice demand. If that right be denied to
the most desperate criminal in a foreign country, his own government can
and ought to protect him against the
wrong."-Elihu Root.

Kansas v. Marshall
Decided May 21, 1928.
Evidence-Presumption of Death After
Seven Years Absence.
Facts-Insured was forty years old,
a sober, Industrious farmer, happily
married, with a family of three children. In September, 1920, he drove to
Denver to attend a relative's funeral.
He reached Denver safely and bought
certain supplies for his family, such as
groceries and the like, and placed them
in his car, but thereafter failed to attend the funeral and disappeared without trace. Plaintiff sues as beneficiary,

Requisites of a Lawyer
"Accuracy and diligence are much
more necessary to a lawyer than great
comprehension of mind, or brilliancy
of talent. His business is to refine,
define, to look into authorities, and
compare cases and split hairs. A man
can never gallop over the fields of law
on Pegasus, nor fly across them on the
wing of oratory. If he would stand
on terra firma he must descend; If he
would be a great lawyer, he must first
consent to be only a great drudge."Daniel Webster.

